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JUSTICE AT THE BORDER: SHOULD COURTS PROVIDE RELIEF 
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS AT THE BORDER? 
 




In two recent cases, children were shot by Border Patrol agents 
across the United States and Mexico border. In one case, the Ninth 
Circuit found the Border Patrol agent was not entitled to qualified 
immunity and should pay damages to the teen’s family. However, the 
Fifth Circuit refused to allow damages in the other case because of 
concerns over national security. The circuit split raises questions over 
separation of powers and how far the power of the courts should go 
when deciding damages in cases involving transnational issues. This 
Article discusses officials’ qualified immunity and its limits when 
constitutional violations occur; judicially created Bivens damages; 
and the circuit split over separation of powers concerns and fairness 
to plaintiffs.   
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Tensions run high at the United States and Mexico border. Concerns 
over drugs, crime, and illegal immigration at the border involve 
national security and foreign policy, causing significant political 
attention.1 A recent circuit split could bring attention to the judiciary’s 
reaction to the border, as courts are asked to make decisions about 
Border Patrol agents’ lability in cross-border shootings.2 But courts 
already have a history of limited extension of these kinds of damages.  
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics,3 the Supreme Court first recognized a damages-cause-of-
action for federal officials’ constitutional violations. Over the last fifty 
years, courts have hesitated to find additional Bivens actions. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi4 as well as circuit 
decisions in Hernandez v. Mesa5 and Rodriguez v. Swartz,6 add new 
questions about allowing Bivens claims in circumstances arousing 
national security concerns. This Article will discuss the history of 
qualified immunity and Bivens claims, the discussions of the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuit courts in deciding the Hernandez and Rodriguez cases, 
and how the Court should resolve the circuit split.  
Section II first discusses the development of qualified immunity to 
eliminate personal liability when harm is caused in an official’s role 
and the limits of qualified immunity. Next, Section II discusses Bivens 
claims—the history and development of the “Bivens test” in a “new 
context.” Lastly, Section II discusses how courts have applied the 
Bivens test requiring (1) no other adequate remedy and (2) no special 
factors counseling hesitation.  
Section III discusses the benefits and drawbacks of allowing Bivens 
claims. First, the drawbacks of allowing Bivens claims include: 
 
 1. Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a 
Constitutional Clash, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html. 
 2. Adam Liptak, Two U.S. Agents Fired into Mexico, Killing Teenagers. Only 
One Faces a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/us/politics/agents-border-killings-supreme-
court.html. 
 3. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971). 
 4. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 5. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 6. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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overstepping separation of powers concerns, unfairness to government 
officials and ineffective public service, and exerting a burden on 
agencies that may shift focus from pressing public issues to putting 
more policies in place to protect officials. Second, the benefits of 
allowing Bivens claims include: the judiciary acting, as it should, to 
create remedies to constitutional violations, deterring federal officials 
from violating clearly established constitutional rights, and fairly 
providing remedy for constitutional violations. 
Section IV discusses the circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits. Both courts’ determinations of special factors counseling 
hesitation are discussed and analyzed. While the Ninth Circuit argued 
that none of these factors were present, the Fifth Circuit said it was not 
even a close case. Section V proposes how the Supreme Court should 
act. This Section provides suggestions for a resolution that asks courts 
not to refuse causes of action until “special factors” are fully 
scrutinized and government officials are held accountable.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Federal officials are protected from liability by qualified immunity 
unless an official violates a clearly established constitutional right.7 In 
the absence of a statute allowing plaintiffs to seek damages against 
federal officials, the Supreme Court recognized a judicially implied 
cause of action under the Constitution itself.8 This is known as a 
“Bivens claim.”9 To successfully bring a Bivens claim, a federal 
official must violate a clearly established constitutional right and 
damages must be the appropriate remedy—damages are appropriate 
when there is no other remedy and there are no special factors that 
counsel hesitation.10 The development of qualified immunity and 
Bivens claims are discussed in turn.  
A. Qualified Immunity 
Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine that shields government 
officials from suit for wrongdoing within the scope of their official 
role.11 In 1967, the Supreme Court first decided officials were entitled 
 
 7. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 8. See generally Bivens, 403 U.S. 388. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Jordan Emily, The Essence of Civil Liberty: Legitimacy and Judicial 
Oversight for the Targeted Killing of an American Citizen through the Bivens Claim, 
47 U. MEM. L. REV. 887, 896 (2017). 
 11. Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Immunity, 93 NOTRE 
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to qualified immunity in Pierson v. Ray.12 In Pierson, the Court 
grounded qualified immunity in defense of good faith and probable 
cause.13  
In the last fifty years, qualified immunity has undergone judicial 
revision and clarification “both small and large, to the substance and 
the procedural framework.”14 In 1982, one of the greatest changes in 
the doctrine came in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.15 Before Harlow, plaintiffs 
could defeat qualified immunity in two ways—through a subjective 
bad faith standard or an objectively reasonable person standard.16  
First, a plaintiff could show an official’s actions were in bad faith if 
the act occurred “with the malicious intention” to deprive an 
individual of their constitutional rights.17 Second, a plaintiff could 
show that the official “knew or reasonably should have known that the 
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate 
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]”—an objective question.18  
The Court in Harlow was concerned that the subjective standard—
questions regarding a government official’s motive—unnecessarily 
kept insubstantial claims from early resolution.19 The Court decided 
to eliminate the subjective question of qualified immunity. Thus, the 
good-faith standard no longer applies.20 Further, the Court highlighted 
additional policies behind qualified immunity that went beyond its 
blanket “unfair burden” reasoning, asserting qualified immunity 
protected against the “expenses of litigation, the diversion of official 
energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens 
from acceptance of public office.”21 The Court also cited its previous 
policy stating qualified immunity ensures public officials are not 
deterred from taking decisive actions that are necessary to their jobs.22 
Today’s standard for qualified immunity provides protection 
“regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of 
 
DAME L. REV. 1999, 2000 (2018). 
 12. See generally Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
 13. Id. at 556–57 (“We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, 
which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action 
for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under § 
1983.”). 
 14. Michelman, supra note 11, at 2005. 
 15. Id. at 2003. 
 16. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 815–16. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 814. 
 22. Id. 
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law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law 
and fact,” as long as it meets the reasonable standard.23 Qualified 
immunity protects officials in all cases except when an official violates 
“clearly established” constitutional rights.24 If an official violates 
constitutional rights, there is no protection from liability when it is 
“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.”25  
Interestingly, during the revisions in the last fifty years, Congress 
has remained silent on the question of qualified immunity while the 
Court has modified the doctrine based on its own policy judgments.26 
In 1987, the Court acknowledged that it had “completely reformulated 
qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the 
common law.”27 Although the judiciary is not the branch to determine 
policy, it seems clear that the development and continuation of 
qualified immunity through court actions have been established based 
on policy considerations.28  
B. Bivens Claims 
Bivens claims are judicially created remedies that allow individuals 
to seek damages when federal officials’ conduct violates a 
constitutional right and it is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable 
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that 
right.”29 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy against officials who 
violate constitutional rights but only applies to state and local officials 
and not federal officials.30  
In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied right under the 
Fourth Amendment to sue federal officials for money damages.31 In 
that case, Webster Bivens alleged that federal narcotics agents broke 
into his house, searched it, and arrested him without a warrant.32 The 
search and arrest were conducted in front of Bivens’s wife and 
 
 23. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).  
 24. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 25. Michelman, supra note 11. 
 26. Id. at 2005–06. 
 27. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). 
 28. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. 
 29. Michelman, supra note 11. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 397 (1971). 
 32. Id. at 389. 
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children, and the agents threatened to arrest his family.33 The Court 
found this conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.34  
The government argued that Bivens could sue for damages under 
state tort law.35 However, the Court rejected state tort law as an avenue 
of relief because it was an insufficient alternative.36 The Court found 
that state law might be “inconsistent or even hostile” to federal civil 
rights.37 The facts of the case could have allowed the officers to escape 
liability under state law.38 The officers knocked on the plaintiff’s door, 
requested entry, and were granted entry by the plaintiff.39 Under state 
law, consent is a defense.40 Therefore, the Court found a federal cause 
of action was necessary because state law was unreliable.41  
Bivens had no remedy because there was no statutory remedy for 
violations by federal officials and no torts remedies were available to 
him. The Court reasoned that money damages were appropriate since 
“[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy 
for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”42 The Court explained 
that “for people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”43 The 
Bivens claim recognizes an implied cause of action directly under the 
authority of the Constitution, not under an enabling statute.44 The 
Court stated “where federally protected rights have been invaded . . . 
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary 
relief.”45    
To successfully bring a Bivens claim, courts require a constitutional 
violation against a personal right.46 Since Bivens, courts are reluctant 
to extend Bivens claims “to any new context or new category of 
defendants.”47 A new context is present if the case differs in a 
meaningful way.48 If a new context is present, courts apply a “Bivens 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 389–90. 
 35. Id. at 390–91. 
 36. Id. at 391–95. 
 37. Id. at 394. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 395. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 44. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). 
 45. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
 46. Emily, supra note 10, at 896–97. 
 47. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001). 
 48. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 816 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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test” to determine whether damages are the appropriate remedy.49 
Courts have found that damages are the appropriate remedy when a 
plaintiff demonstrates: (1) no other remedies and (2) no special factors 
counseling hesitation.50 Some argue that these special factors have 
grown so large as to dominate the way the court considers Bivens 
claims.51  
In cases asserting a Bivens claim, qualified immunity has gone from 
its status as a total defense to an element—showing a violation of a 
constitutional right—of the Bivens plaintiff’s cause of action.52 In 
these actions, the plaintiff bears the burden of specific pleading to stop 
a defendant from securing dismissal of the claim.53 A Bivens claim is 
not available against a federal agency itself, but individual officials 
incur personal liability.54 In a Bivens action, a supervisory official 
cannot be liable solely on account of the acts or omissions of his or 
her subordinates.55 In other words, the doctrine of respondeat superior 
does not apply. Thus, a plaintiff must allege that the individual 
defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation.  
The next two sections discuss successful Bivens claims. Section 1 
examines previously established Bivens claims and courts’ hesitation 
to expand when a “new context” is present.56 Section 2 describes when 
damages are the correct remedy—when there are no other remedies 
for plaintiffs,57 and there are no special factors counseling hesitation. 
58   
1. Bivens Contexts 
The development of Bivens claims in subsequent cases created two 
additional causes of actions where damages are more generally 
awarded.59 After the 1971 decision, the Court extended Bivens against 
federal officials under other constitutional provisions—the equal 
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
 
 49. Emily, supra note 10. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009). 
 53. Id. at 686–87. 
 54. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 55. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 
 56. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See generally Bernard Bell, Reexamining Bivens After Ziglar v. Abbasi, 9 
CONLAWNOW 77, 78–79 (2018). 
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Amendment60 and the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.61  Altogether, these three cases are “the Bivens trilogy.”62 
Outside of these established Bivens claims, a “new context” is 
present.63 
The first extension, under the Fifth Amendment, was a gender-
based employment discrimination suit against a congressman in 
1979.64 In Davis v. Passman, Congressman Passman fired Davis 
believing the position should be held by a man.65 The Court first 
considered whether the stated cause of action was in direct reliance 
upon the Due Process Clause, thus constituting a constitutional 
violation of a personal right.66 The Court held that the Due Process 
Clause did imply a direct cause of action.67  
Then, the Court turned to whether damages were appropriate relief 
for that cause of action.68 This step took further determination as the 
Court first decided whether there was another adequate remedy.69 The 
Court found that no alternative remedy existed because an injunctive 
order of reinstatement was impossible since Passman was no longer a 
congressman.70 Further, the Court argued that the judiciary is 
equipped to determine damages because the federal courts have 
experience “evaluating claims for backpay due to illegal sex 
discrimination.”71 Next, the Court determined if there were any special 
factors counseling hesitation.72 The Court found that a suit against a 
congressman presented a factor, but it did not counsel hesitation 
because awarding damages would not impede official duties.73 The 
Court examined congressional silence as another factor.74 The Court 
 
 60. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979). 
 61. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980). 
 62. See Bernard Bell, Critiquing Hernandez v. Mesa: Contextual Assessment of 
Administrative Law’s Potential as an Alternative to Bivens Remedies, 36 YALE J. ON 
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 25, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/critiquing-
hernandez-v-mesa-contextual-assessment-of-administrative-laws-potential-as-an-
alternative-to-bivens-remedies/. 
 63. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 816 (2018). 
 64. Passman, 442 U.S. at 230. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 236–44. 
 67. Id. at 243–44. 
 68. Id. at 245–48. 
 69. Id. at 245. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 245–46. 
 73. Id. at 246. 
 74. Id. at 246–47. 
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rejected congressional silence as a factor counseling hesitation 
because it reasoned that unless there was clear intent that Congress 
meant to exclude alternative remedies when statutory relief was 
unavailable, there is no factor counseling hesitation.75 With no 
alternative remedy for the plaintiff and no special factors counseling 
hesitation, the Court concluded damages were the appropriate 
remedy.76 Thus, Passman became the second successful Bivens claim 
because the cause of action arose from a violation of a constitutional 
right and damages were the appropriate remedy.  
Next, in 1980, a Bivens claim arising under the Eighth Amendment 
was found in the case of Carlson v. Green.77 Carlson involved a 
federal prisoner suffering from chronic asthma.78 On the day the 
prisoner died, no prison official called a doctor to examine him even 
though he remained in the prison hospital for eight hours.79 Here, the 
Court focused on the Bivens test—whether damages were the 
appropriate remedy.80 Carlson considered whether Congress provided 
an alternative remedy, which was expressly “declared to be 
a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as 
equally effective.”81 At issue was a possible alternative remedy under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).82 The Court found that the 
FTCA, which allows damages for intentional torts committed by 
federal law enforcement agents, is not a substitute but works as a 
parallel remedy to Bivens damages.83 The Court argued that the FTCA 
does not protect constitutional rights, and thus “without a clear 
congressional mandate” the Court cannot find that the FTCA is an 
equally effective remedy.84 The Court allowed Bivens damages in this 
case because the Court found no factors counseling hesitation.85 
Today, the Court no longer applies the “equally effective” remedy 
requirement but requires only an alternative remedy.86 
 
 75. Id. at 247. 
 76. Id. at 248. 
 77. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980). 
 78. Id. at 16 n.1. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 18. 
 81. Id. at 18–19. 
 82. Id. at 19. 
 83. Id. at 19–20. 
 84. Id. at 23. 
 85. Id. at 19, 23. 
 86. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 678 (1987) (quoting Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)). 
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The Bivens trilogy expanded the use of Bivens remedies. However, 
since Passman and Carlson, the Court has mostly rejected Bivens 
claims, describing the expansion of Bivens as a “disfavored” activity.87 
The Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens damages “to any new 
context or new category of defendants.”88 Overall, courts are cautious 
to extend Bivens remedies to new contexts.89  
A case presents a new context whenever it differs “in a meaningful 
way from previous Bivens cases.”90 A new context can be present even 
in a case arising under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.91 
The fact that Bivens derived from an unconstitutional search and 
seizure claim is not determinative.92 For example, the plaintiffs 
in Abbasi asserted claims for strip searches under both the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments.  However, the Supreme Court found a new context 
despite similarities between “the right and the mechanism of injury” 
involved in previous successful Bivens claims.93 The Court offered a 
nonexclusive list of differences: 
A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the 
officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or 
specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to 
how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be 
confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the 
officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary 
into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential 
special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.94 
When a new context is present, the court questions if damages are 
the appropriate remedy.95 It is a two-part question—first, whether 
there is another remedy available to the plaintiff, and second, whether 
special factors counsel hesitation in creating the remedy.96 
 
 87. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). 
 88. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001). 
 89. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Remediation of Constitutional Harm 
through Bivens Action in Immigration Context, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 201, § 16 (2013). 
 90. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 738 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ziglar, 137 
S. Ct. at 1849). 
 91. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 816 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859). 
 94. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860. 
 95. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 915 F. Supp. 2d 314, 352 (E.D. N.Y. 2013). 
 96. Id. 
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2. Damages as the Appropriate Remedy 
Damages should be the only means of relief to successfully assert a 
Bivens claim.97 First, to conclude damages are justified, courts 
determine if any alternative remedy exists.98 If courts find remedies 
provided by agency administrative processes, equitable remedies 
available to courts, or federal statutory or state tort law damages 
remedies, then Bivens damages are not appropriate.99 Going further, 
lower courts have refused to extend Bivens claims even when no 
alternative remedy exists unless the absence of alternative remedies is 
attributable to legislative oversight.100  
Second, courts consider special factors counseling hesitation.101 
Recently, Abbasi clarified the concept of “special factors” stating, 
“separation-of-powers principles . . . should be central to the 
analysis.”102 The decision from Abbasi focuses “on whether the 
Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to 
consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages 
action to proceed.”103 Thus, the purpose of including special factors in 
courts’ determinations is to examine whether a judicial decision would 
interfere with another branch. Courts fear that not considering special 
factors “would create a remedy with uncertain limits.”104   
III. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF BIVENS CLAIMS 
There are functional reasons both to allow Bivens damages and to 
abolish the remedy altogether. Because courts examine many factors 
before allowing Bivens damages, successful claims occur in narrow 
circumstances.105 Additionally, the Court acknowledges that 
 
 97. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 739 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 98. Emily, supra note 10. 
 99. Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2018). See, e.g., Torres 
v. Taylor, 456 F. Supp. 951, 954–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (damage remedy was not 
allowed even though there the fifth and eighth amendment rights were violated 
because the court found the FTCA adequate); Neely v. Blumenthal, 458 F. Supp. 
945, 960 (D.D.C. 1978) (no damages allowed for employment discrimination 
because Title VII adequate). 
 100. Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2012).   
 101. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 915 F. Supp. 2d 314, 352 n.25 (E.D. N.Y. 2013). 
 102. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). 
 103. Id. at 1857–58.  
 104. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 105. See generally Nicole B. Godfrey, Holding Federal Prison Officials 
Accountable: The Case for Recognizing a Damages Remedy for Federal Prisoners’ 
Free Exercise Claims, 96 NEB. L. REV. 924, 937–38 (2018). 
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extending Bivens is highly disfavored.106 So why have Bivens claims 
at all? This section will examine both the drawbacks and benefits of 
allowing Bivens claims.  
A. Drawbacks of Allowing Bivens Claims 
Allowing Bivens claims does have drawbacks. First, allowing the 
judiciary to establish Bivens claims raises separation of powers 
concerns because the judiciary seemingly oversteps into policy.107 
Second, allowing Bivens claims may be unfair to government officials 
and ultimately cause ineffective public service.108 Third, allowing 
Bivens claims may exert a burden on agencies that may shift focus 
from pressing public issues to putting more policies in place that 
protect officials.109 
First, allowing Bivens claims can infringe on the other branches’ 
authority because the judicial branch lacks authority to make policy.110 
The judicial branch should not declare judgments that limit or overrule 
the policy of the executive branch or Congress on complex and rapidly 
changing matters.111 The political question doctrine is a function of 
separation of powers that defines questions that are nonjusticiable.112 
The Supreme Court itself found that some questions are political in 
nature and are not for the courts to resolve.113 The political question 
doctrine “excludes from judicial review those controversies which 
revolve around policy choices and value determinations 
constitutionally committed for resolution to . . . Congress or . . . the 
Executive Branch.”114  
When cases assert a Bivens claim, courts should determine whether 
allowing damage remedies requires answering political questions.115 
 
 106. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857. 
 107. Id. at 1861. 
 108. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 111. Peter Margulies, Curbing Remedies for Official Wrongs: The Need for 
Bivens Suits in National Security Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1153, 1180 
(2018). 
 112. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
 115. See, e.g., Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court 
found that the political question doctrine does not apply because the Wilsons did not 
challenge any foreign policy or national security decisions entrusted to the Executive 
Branch. While the case may have implicated national security, the lawsuit for Bivens 
damages itself is not about national security in a manner that would preclude 
jurisdiction because of the political question doctrine. 
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For example, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the 
subsequent war in the Middle East, Bivens claims were brought 
against officials for constitutional violations, but courts recognized 
that any questions relating to national security may present an overstep 
of their authority.116 The Constitution allocates foreign affairs and 
defense to Congress and the President, and they are beyond the scope 
of the judiciary’s authority.117 Because courts have limitations when 
policy determinations are required, Bivens claims should not be 
allowed when damages would interfere with national security, 
defense, or other affairs outside constitutionally granted authority.118 
Second, allowing Bivens claims may be unfair to government 
officials and ultimately cause ineffective public service.119 The Court 
has expressly stated that qualified immunity protects against expenses 
of litigation, the deterrence of citizens from taking public office, and 
the deterrence of public officials to take decisive actions necessary in 
their jobs.120 Denying Bivens claims may protect against these 
concerns.  
There is a recognition that constitutional law is constantly evolving, 
and public officials cannot be “expected to predict the future course of 
constitutional law.”121 Qualified immunity seeks to balance competing 
values: “on one hand, government officials sometimes suffer no 
personal liability even when they violate constitutional rights, [b]ut at 
the same time, the threat of punishing an officer for violating 
previously unknown rights could chill legitimate governmental 
action.”122 Thus, not subjecting individuals to liability prevents the 
high burden of asking officials to constantly keep up with every 
change in the law and the threat of ineffective service.   
Additionally, the Court has focused on qualified immunity’s 
presumed ability to shield government officials from burdens 
associated with discovery and trial.123 Because costs of litigation are 
high, it might follow that officials conduct a cost-benefit analysis and 
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choose to protect themselves over the community.124 The Court is 
worried that the threat of litigation and the cost-burden of litigation 
will deter officials from seeking public positions.125 Officials, 
concerned about the costs of damages, might encourage inaction by 
officers to reduce liability costs.126 
Third, on an agency level, the Court has pointed out that without 
qualified immunity there is a danger of “the diversion of official 
energy from pressing public issues.”127 Officials and agencies should 
have the discretion to make decisions, especially in areas of pressing 
public issues, like security.128 Changing procedures to encourage 
inaction in security or defense positions would be a dangerous result. 
Not allowing Bivens claims and reducing the risk of litigation may 
promote more effective performance of important service jobs by 
individuals and agencies.  
B. Benefits of Allowing Bivens Claims 
Allowing Bivens claims does have benefits. First, the judiciary is 
needed to create remedies for constitutional violations.129 Second, 
allowing Bivens claims against officials may be an important way to 
deter federal officials from violating clearly established constitutional 
rights.130 Third, allowing Bivens claims serves the principle of 
fairness—when someone is harmed there should be a remedy for that 
harm.131 
First, the judiciary should be the branch to create remedies for 
constitutional violations because it has express authority to protect 
individual rights.132 A Bivens claim recognizes an implied cause of 
action directly under the authority of the Constitution, not under an 
enabling statute.133 In creating Bivens claims, the Supreme Court used 
the principle established in Marbury v. Madison, which states that 
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when “federally protected rights have been invaded, courts will be 
alert to adjust its remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”134 
Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens, asserts that the judiciary holds 
the responsibility to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.135 
The judicial branch’s power allows the exercise of judicial discretion 
within fair limits, particularly in cases dealing with individual rights 
and fundamental issues.136 The courts have the constitutional power to 
craft a remedy that includes “the power to define the contours” and to 
define limits to the remedy.137  Allowing Bivens claims when 
constitutional rights are violated is an appropriate remedy because the 
judicial branch has express authority to create remedies.   
Second, allowing Bivens claims may deter federal officials from 
violating citizens’ clearly established constitutional rights because it 
subjects individuals to liability.138 The Court has directly stated that 
damages as a remedy are necessary to “deter future violations.”139 The 
idea of allowing liability for general deterrence is present throughout 
tort law.140 Allowing liability will force people to “take account of, or 
at least to consider, all the costs of their proposed activity” and will 
lead to “efficient investments in safety.”141 Allowing damages may 
help encourage more mindful actions by taking into account costs 
usually ignored “because existing legal rules do not provide liability 
for those costs.”142 Because allowing Bivens claims would subject 
individuals to liability, those costs can be used to deter future bad 
actions.  
While it has been argued that litigation imposes an unfair burden on 
officials and may deter individuals from taking public positions, 
evidence suggests that “the threat of being sued does not play a 
meaningful role in job application decisions.”143 Additionally, a 
survey of law enforcement officers found a number of respondents 
believe that lawsuits do deter unlawful behavior and officers should be 
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subject to civil liability.144 Thus, it is questionable that individuals are 
deterred from entering public positions, and some information 
suggests a perception by public officials that lawsuits should be 
allowed. Therefore, disallowing Bivens claims based on fears that 
individuals will be unlikely to take public positions is likely 
unsubstantiated.  
Third, allowing Bivens claims serves the principle of fairness 
because it provides a remedy when plaintiffs have no other options.145 
Justice Harlan emphasized in his Bivens concurrence, “for people in 
Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”146 Recently, the Court 
reasserted the importance of having no other adequate remedy stating, 
“if equitable remedies prove insufficient, a damages remedy might be 
necessary to redress past harm. . ..”147 Under Bivens, when there are 
no other means of relief, courts have recognized that plaintiffs should 
be remedied for irreparable constitutional violations.148  It would be 
an unjust outcome to leave plaintiffs like Bivens with no remedy when 
the court finds their constitutional rights are violated. What would be 
the value in the Constitution if the courts did not uphold its 
protections? Allowing plaintiffs an avenue of relief not only helps 
plaintiffs but also offers recourse against violations of constitutional 
rights.  
IV.  SPLIT BETWEEN SPECIAL FACTORS AND FAIRNESS TO PLAINTIFFS 
The Bivens test asks whether there are “special factors,” which are 
usually concerned with separation of powers implications and whether 
there is any other remedy.149 This test weighs the danger of special 
factors against the unfairness of leaving plaintiffs without any relief. 
Because special factors are not expressly defined, courts have applied 
this inquiry inconsistently. This inconsistency is evident in the 
following cases, which have caused a circuit split between the Fifth 
Circuit and Ninth Circuit.150 The facts in the Hernandez and Rodriguez 
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cases are remarkably similar, yet two different courts have applied the 
Bivens test differently.  
In Hernandez v. Mesa, the Fifth Circuit refused to allow damages 
after a Border Patrol agent shot and killed a teen across the United 
States and Mexico border citing multiple special factors.151 Shortly 
after, in Rodriguez v. Swartz, the Ninth Circuit allowed damages under 
similar circumstances because they found no special factor counseling 
hesitation.152 The special factors discussed in each case were 
separation of powers, national security, and foreign policy.153 While 
the Ninth Circuit argued that none of these factors were present,154 the 
Fifth Circuit said it was not even a close case.155 How did each of these 
courts come to such different outcomes on special factors? The next 
two sections discuss each courts’ analysis.  
A.  The Fifth Circuit’s Special Factors Finding 
In Hernandez v. Mesa, the Fifth Circuit focused its analysis on 
special factors counseling hesitation including separation of powers 
concerns, Congress’ silence, and opening a new context and new pool 
of plaintiffs.156 In Hernandez, a Border Patrol agent fatally shot Sergio 
Hernandez, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national.157 At the time, 
Hernandez was standing near a culvert that separates El Paso, Texas 
from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.158 Hernandez and several friends had ran 
up the culvert’s embankment towards the United States side, touched 
the border fence, and ran back.159 Agent Mesa had fired a shot from 
the United States side of the border killing the teen.160  
In its opinion, the Supreme Court remanded Hernandez to the Fifth 
Circuit after its decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, which refused to permit 
a Bivens claim in a national security context.161 On remand, the Fifth 
Circuit held that “[t]he transnational aspect of the facts present[ed] a 
‘new context’ under Bivens, and numerous ‘special factors’ 
counsel[ed] against federal courts’ interference with the Executive and 
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Legislative branches of the federal government.”162 The court held that 
the case was not a “garden variety excessive force case against a 
federal law enforcement officer.”163 The court considered these 
special factors: (1) an extension of Bivens threatens the political 
branches’ supervision of national security; (2) interference with 
foreign affairs and diplomacy more generally; (3) Congress’s failure 
to provide a damages remedy in these circumstances; and (4) the 
extraterritorial aspect of the case as it aggravates the separation of 
powers issues.164 
After weighing the special factors, the Fifth Circuit decided it was 
“not a close case.”165 Because “[t]he only relevant threshold—that a 
factor ‘counsels hesitation’—is remarkably low,” the court had little 
difficulty in holding that this was not a case for a Bivens claim.166 The 
special factors are now considered.  
The first, second, and fourth special factors mentioned by the 
court—the extension of Bivens threatening the political branches’ 
supervision of national security, interference with foreign affairs and 
diplomacy more generally, and the extraterritorial aspect of the case—
are separation of powers concerns. It is easy to argue this is a matter 
of national security because Border Patrol agents are charged with 
protecting the border. Since the political branches, and not the judicial, 
supervise national security, foreign affairs, and diplomacy, the Fifth 
Circuit was inclined to not interfere with the other branches.167 When 
federal officials injure citizens from other countries outside of the 
United States, these are diplomatic matters that are delicate in 
nature,168 and the court asserts they “are rarely proper subjects for 
judicial intervention.”169 While it seems well established that 
Congress and the executive should supervise national security, foreign 
affairs, and diplomacy, the court did not explain how allowing 
damages for families will disrupt national security, foreign affairs, and 
diplomacy. 
The third special factor—Congress’s failure to provide a damages 
remedy in these circumstances—speaks to Congress’s intention. The 
court argues Congress’s intention is clear through its consistent and 
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explicit refusals to provide damage remedies for noncitizens injured 
abroad.170 However, in the last fifty years, Congress has had the 
opportunity to create a remedy or expressly deny Bivens remedies, but 
it has been silent.171 Congress’s silence can be taken as acquiescence 
because damages have been allowed in multiple contexts.172 Although 
Congress has failed to provide a remedy and has specifically denied 
damage remedies to noncitizens injured abroad,173 Bivens damages are 
specific to constitutional injuries, and the judicial branch should create 
remedies for injuries arising under the Constitution.174 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit is concerned that Hernandez allowing a 
Bivens remedy in this case would open up a new avenue to plaintiffs 
like Hernandez, Rodriguez, and their families. However, in Passman, 
the court dismissed the idea that the risk of opening the federal courts 
to a flood of claims was a special factor counseling hesitation.175 The 
court reasoned that courts cannot be closed because constitutional 
principles should be more important than any reason to limit the class 
of interests to protect.176  
Although the Fifth Circuit cites many separation of powers 
concerns, it does not discuss how allowing damages for the families 
will disrupt national security, foreign affairs, and diplomacy. In this 
case, the court’s safe decision demonstrates its deference to Congress 
and the President by avoiding overstepping its role. Because the Fifth 
Circuit found many factors counseling hesitation, the court refused to 
allow damages.  
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Fairness Finding 
In Rodriguez v. Swartz, the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on the 
plaintiff having no other remedy and the need to deter federal 
officials.177 In Rodriguez, a Border Patrol agent standing on American 
soil, shot and killed a teenage Mexican citizen who was walking down 
a street in Mexico.178 The majority extended a Bivens damage here.179 
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The court described the teenager as “peacefully walking down . . . a 
street in Nogales, Mexico” and “without warning or provocation, 
Swartz shot [him] dead.”180 The agent fired somewhere between 
fourteen and thirty bullets across the border and hit him ten times, 
mostly in the back.181  
The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez upheld a district court’s denial of 
qualified immunity because the official’s use of force was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment given that the teenager 
was not suspected of any crime, was not fleeing or resisting arrest, and 
did not pose a threat to anyone.182  
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the majority reasoned that Bivens damages 
should be extended because there was no other adequate remedy, and 
there was no reason to infer that Congress deliberately chose to 
withhold a remedy.183 The court held that Rodriguez lacked an 
adequate alternative remedy because she could not bring a tort claim 
under the FTCA, restitution from a parallel criminal proceeding would 
be inadequate, and there was no evidence that Mexican courts could 
grant a remedy.184 
Next, the Ninth Circuit court argues there are no special factors 
here.185 First, the majority argues damages in this case would not 
interfere with government policies because this case involves standard 
law enforcement operations and excessive force, similar to force seen 
in other cases.186 Second, the majority found no issues with national 
security but instead equated the case to other domestic law 
enforcement cases when excessive force was used.187 The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that awarding damages could not possibly interfere 
with national security, and it is within courts’ authority to provide a 
remedy for a violation of a protected right because the case did not 
involve any special security risks.188 The court held that national 
security concerns “could not be waved like a ‘talisman.’”189 The court 
emphasized that it was not likely that national security involves 
shooting people walking down the street.190 Additionally, the Ninth 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 738–39. 
 184. Id. at 739–44. 
 185. Id. at 744. 
 186. Id. at 745. 
 187. Id. at 745–46. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 745. 
 190. Id. 
  
2020] JUSTICE AT THE BORDER 457 
 
Circuit majority suggests that holding Swartz liable would 
meaningfully deter other Border Patrol agents from acting in the same 
way.191 
The dissent argues—like the Fifth Circuit majority—that Bivens 
should not be extended here because the case presents a new context 
for a Bivens claim.192 Additionally, the dissent argues the court must 
exercise caution in light of concerns about a circuit split and separation 
of powers issues.193  
The Ninth Circuit awarded damages because it did not find any 
factors counseling hesitation and did find there was no other remedy 
for the Rodriguez family. There is no other law to provide relief, and 
there are no guarantees Mexican courts could secure damages. At the 
core of the Ninth Circuit majority’s opinion is the reasoning that it 
would be unfair to leave a family with nothing after a wrongful death 
by a government official. Similar to Bivens, for these families, it is 
damages or nothing.  
V.  COURTS SHOULD PROVIDE RELIEF 
Courts should provide relief to plaintiffs like Rodriguez and 
Hernandez. This Section provides a discussion for a possible 
resolution, suggesting that courts not refuse causes of action until 
special factors are fully scrutinized and government officials are held 
accountable.  
As the Fifth Circuit suggested, the special factors discussed in the 
circuit split are not demonstrated to interfere with national security, 
foreign affairs, or diplomacy.194 The Supreme Court should allow 
Bivens damages in these cases because it is not clear special factors 
counsel hesitation. 
The Supreme Court must make a decision to resolve the circuit split. 
As it stands, if someone is shot by a Border Patrol agent in violation 
of a constitutional right across the border in California or Arizona they 
have a remedy, but not if they were shot across the border by an agent 
in Texas.195 Still, the Supreme Court is reluctant to make decisions 
that could overstep into areas protected by separation of powers.196 
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They will likely decline the cause of action in the Hernandez case 
because the Court is not supposed to make policy determinations.   
Plaintiffs and injured parties should have an avenue for relief. 
Courts do have authority to create and contour remedies to address 
constitutional injuries and should protect individual rights.197 While 
courts disfavor expanding Bivens claims,198 courts still say new Bivens 
remedies can be inferred,199 and the Bivens trilogy suggests that 
extending Bivens to a new context does not preclude the court from 
limiting its own extension.200 Allowing Bivens damages in these two 
cases will not necessarily create a large expansion of damages, but it 
could be an opportunity to provide guidance for lower courts by 
defining the contours of Bivens claims in this context.   
Next, the Court can address separation of powers concerns by 
further scrutinizing whether special factors actually counsel hesitation. 
By examining how allowing damages would actually affect these 
“special factors,” courts can still show respect to the other branches 
while finding the best outcome for plaintiffs. Courts can respect the 
other branches while still exercising its power to protect vulnerable 
interests. If plaintiffs are forced to wait for Congress to expressly 
provide or deny redress, the courts allow individuals to be injured 
without any recourse.   
Additionally, because there is not a bright-line rule for defining 
special factors counseling hesitation, courts have used discretion to 
rule on different sides and inconsistencies persist.201 It seems that 
special factors counseling hesitation have “grown so large as to 
swallow the Bivens claim in many courts.”202  
For example, in Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, a district court was asked to 
decide a case arising under a Bivens claim for damages for the family 
of a deceased teenager.203 In 2011, a drone strike unintentionally killed 
Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi, a teenage United States citizen, not the 
intended target of the attack.204 The family claimed that these officials 
violated the Fifth Amendment rights of the decedents when they 
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authorized the drone strikes.205 The court had to decide whether 
federal officials could be held personally liable for their roles in drone 
strikes abroad when they kill United States citizens.206 The nature of 
the case raised national security concerns and that factor alone was 
enough to deny the claim.207  
The court noted that the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the 
Seventh Circuit have decided that “special factors––including 
separation of powers, national security, and the risk of interfering with 
military decisions–– preclude the extension of a Bivens remedy” to 
cases like Al-Aulaqi.208 If causes of action are being refused for the 
mere mention of issues related to national security, then the court is, 
as the majority in Rodriguez suggested, waving national security 
concerns like a “talisman.”209 While safety and security are important, 
courts should be looking more closely at cases to determine if allowing 
damages will threaten national security. In the Rodriguez and 
Hernandez families’ cases, it seems unlikely that subjecting 
individuals, who caused wrongful death, to personal liability will 
threaten the safety of the United States and Mexico border.  
Because holding governmental officials accountable does not 
implicate national security in the circuit split cases, the Supreme Court 
should provide relief to the Rodriguez and Hernandez families. Courts 
should not refuse causes of action until special factors are fully 
scrutinized. Separation of powers concerns are important, and courts 
should not interfere with safety and security. However, courts should 
find a connection between allowing damages and special factors 
concerns before denying relief.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
With eyes on the border, the recent circuit split could bring attention 
to the judiciary’s decisions about Border Patrol agents’ lability in 
cross-border shootings. Disqualifying federal agents from immunity 
could subvert agents to personal liability when they violate clearly 
established constitutional rights during their jobs. While Bivens claims 
are disfavored, they are still available to give plaintiffs relief when 
they have no other means of remedy. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ziglar v. Abbasi, as well as circuit decisions in Hernandez v. Mesa 
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and Rodriguez v. Swartz, have only added questions about allowing 
Bivens in circumstances that even touch on national security concerns.  
The history and development of qualified immunity and the Bivens 
claim over the last fifty years has not created a bright-line rule to apply 
to cases. However, the courts have developed the “Bivens test” when 
“new contexts” are present. Applying the Bivens test, which requires 
(1) no other adequate remedy and (2) no special factors counseling 
hesitation, has given some guidance to courts. Still, courts have 
discretion in applying the test and weighing special factors against the 
need for a remedy.  
There are both benefits and drawbacks of allowing Bivens claims. 
The drawbacks of allowing Bivens claims—overstepping separation 
of powers concerns, unfairness to government officials and ineffective 
public service, and exerting a burden on agencies that may shift focus 
from pressing public issues to putting more policies in place to protect 
officials—value federal officials and not overreaching separation of 
powers. The benefits of allowing Bivens claims—the judiciary acting 
to create remedies to constitutional violations, deterring federal 
officials from violating clearly established constitutional rights, and 
fairly providing remedy for constitutional violations—values 
plaintiffs and constitutional rights. 
The circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits demonstrates 
how courts consider the Bivens test differently and what each court 
values more. While the Ninth Circuit argued that none of these factors 
were present, the Fifth Circuit said it was not even a close case. The 
circuits’ discussion of special factors suggests the Supreme Court 
needs to make a decision on which special factors counsel hesitation. 
Courts should not refuse causes of action until “special factors” are 
fully scrutinized and justify courts’ hesitation.  
 
